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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to decide this 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-2(j) (Supp. 1994). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court err in finding that Sandy City had 
any legitimate public purpose for the downzoning of the property of 
Smith Investment Company and Sandy Hills, Inc. (collectively, the 
"Smiths"). The standard of appellate review is a correctness 
standard, with no deference accorded the trial court's 
determination. Cook v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 919 P.2d 56 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1996). 
2. Did the trial court err in finding that Sandy City's 
downzoning of the Smiths' property did not deprive the Smiths of 
all economically viable uses of their land, and, therefore, did not 
constitute a compensable taking. The standard of appellate review 
is a correctness standard, with no deference accorded the trial 
court's determination. Cook v. Zions First Nat'l Bankr 919 P.2d 56 
(Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
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3. Did the trial court err in finding that Sandy City's 
decision to barricade 1055/1075 East Street was "appropriate." 
The standard of appellate review is a correctness standard, with no 
deference accorded the trial court's determination. Cook v. Zions 
First Nat'l Bank, 919 P.2d 56 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
1. Utah Constit. Art. I, § 22. See Addendum B for a 
complete recitation of that section. 
2. U.S. Constit. Amend. V. See Addendum B for a complete 
recitation of that section. 
3. U.S. Constit. Amend. XIV. See Addendum B for a complete 
recitation of that section. 
4. Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-89 (1963). See Addendum B for a 
complete recitation of that section. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Course of Proceedings. 
This case involves cross-motions for summary judgment based 
upon Sandy City's downzoning of approximately 15.8 acres of the 
Smiths' property from commercial to residential. The motions also 
addressed the Smiths' claims of trespass and wrongful barricade 
against Sandy City. 
Oral arguments on the parties' dispositive cross-motions were 
held before Judge Timothy R. Hanson in the Third Judicial District 
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Court on February 2, 1996. The court entered its Summary Judgment 
and Order of Dismissal ("Summary Judgment") in Sandy City's favor 
on September 23, 1996. The Summary Judgment provided for the 
following: 
1. Sandy Cityfs downzoning of the Smiths1 property from 
commercial to residential use is supported by a rational 
relationship to public health, safety and welfare, and the same 
downzoning did not result in a "taking" because the Smiths are 
still able to put the property to "some reasonable use," although 
not the "highest and best use" of their property. 
2. Sandy City's approval of subdivision plats for Brighton 
View and Del Ruby subdivisions does not support a cause of action 
for trespass against Sandy City for escaping water from those 
subdivisions1. 
3. Sandy City's action in barricading the street designated 
as 1055/1075 East Street is not wrongful, as it allows the Smiths 
other access to the Smiths' property. 
On October 21, 1996, the Smiths filed their Notice of Appeal. 
The appeal was "poured over" to this Court on January 2, 1997. 
1
 Although the Smiths' Notice of Appeal listed the trespass 
claim as an issue to be determined on appeal, the Smiths have 
decided not to pursue that issue. 
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B. Statement of Facts, 
Facts Material to the Smiths1 Takings Claim. 
1. In I960, Reed and Barbara Smith purchased approximately 
2 3 acres of undeveloped property on the west side of 700 East 
Street at 9200 South in South Salt Lake County, Utah. (R. at 135). 
2. As specific conditions of that purchase, Mr. and Mrs. 
Smith required that the property be annexed to Sandy City and 
commercially zoned. The property was annexed in May of 1960. (R. 
at 135). 
3. In September, 1960, the property was commercially zoned 
C-l. It was commercially rezoned C-2 in 1962. (R. at 135-136). 
4. In late 1961 or early 1962, the Smiths began construction 
of a shopping center on the property. Sandy City welcomed the 
development and assisted the Smiths in their endeavors. In a 
letter dated October 12, 1961, from Sandy City Corporation to Salt 
Lake County, then Mayor Miller stated: 
[t]he economic center of [Sandy City] has moved from 
[8600 South between State Street and 300 East] and Sandy 
City in June of 1960 after consideration of studies 
prepared by the University of Utah relating to the 
economics of Salt Lake Valley, traffic, population, and 
service requirements, zoned a twenty-five (25) acre tract 
commercial. This tract is located at the corner of 9300 
4 
South and 7th East. In relation to this tract. Sandy 
City has co-operated with the developers of the tract in 
order to assure them of a sound economic basis and a 
representative development. 
(Emphasis added). (R. at 137-138). 
5. In accordance with their development plan and at 
substantial cost, the Smiths developed the front, or east portion 
of the 2 3 acres with a service station and commercial building with 
space for tenants, fronting 700 East. The Smiths then added space 
at the south end of the building for a grocery store. The 
commercial tenants changed over time; in the 1980fs, the Smiths 
razed the service station and car wash. (R. at 138). 
6. In early 1980, the planning staff of Sandy City 
recommended that the rear 15.8 acres of the Smith property be 
downzoned from C-2 to R-2-10 (allowing a duplex on a 10,000 foot 
lot or a single family home on an 8,000 foot lot) or R-l-8 
(allowing a single family home on an 8,000 foot lot). The planning 
staff recommended the change because: 
1. the Sandy Community Citizens' Report recommended 
the western portion of the parcel be rezoned to 
single family residential use; 
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the Sandy City Comprehensive Plan Goals and 
Policies recommend to limit the depth of 700 East 
commercial development to 2 00 feet unless 
conditional use approval is granted; 
the existing 364,500 square feet of retail space 
exceeds the Commercial/Industrial Study 
recommendation that Community Commercial should not 
exceed 250,000 square feet retail space; 
the stub roads into the parcel create traffic 
circulation problems in the existing residential 
and commercial development; 
traffic from the area when developed should enter 
and leave through the existing residential 
subdivision streets and not travel through the 
commercial center; and 
good access to commercial or multiple unit 
development behind the existing commercial 
development would be difficult. 
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(R. at 138-139). 
7. The Smiths vigorously objected to the proposed 
downzoning. They submitted their "Objections to Down-Zoning of 
Commercial Property" dated September 29, 1980, to the Sandy City 
Council and Sandy City Planning Commission. The Smiths claimed 
that the proposed downzoning was unconstitutional and patently 
unfair because (1) the entire 2 3 acres was owned by one family 
through its family companies and downzoning a portion of the entire 
tract was unreasonable; (2) the Smiths pioneered commercial 
development in the 700 East/9400 South vicinity with the blessing 
and encouragement of Sandy City; (3) after purchasing the property, 
the Smiths engaged the University of Utah's Bureau of Economic and 
Business Research to complete a study and analysis of the Smith 
property as a retail shopping center; (4) the study found the 2 3 
acre parcel to be a prime commercial location as Sandy City grew in 
population; (5) the downzoning would be confiscatory and would 
destroy the highest and best use of the property; (6) the 2 00 foot 
depth limit proposed is unrealistic and not in line with the depth 
of the commercial zone in the direct vicinity (9400 South and 700 
East) and on the east side of 700 East directly across from the 
Smith property; and (7) the Smiths contemplated that development of 
the entire tract would include removing some existing uses along 
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7 00 East such as the car wash, which was in fact razed. (R. at 
141-142) . 
8. On April 18, 1981, the Sandy City Council amended the 
zoning map to downzone the rear 15.8 acres of the Smiths' property 
to R-2-10. The Mayor approved the downzoning in May, 1981. (R. at 
144; 459-460) . 
9. In justification of the downzoning, Sandy City relied 
upon the Sandy Community Citizens' Report and the Sandy City 
Comprehensive Plan Goals & Policies. (R. at 140, 139; 459-460). 
10. The Sandy City Comprehensive Plan Goals & Policies as 
adopted in November, 1979, stated with respect to the proposed 700 
East Commercial District: 
[t]he 700 East Commercial District covering both sides of 
700 East from the north city limits to 9800 South is 
intended to encourage a type and quality of land use 
along 700 East that will preclude the development of 
typical strip commercial and to allow 700 East to 
accomplish its function as an important high volume 
traffic artery. Design requirements of this district 
should result in 700 East developing into an attractive, 
dignified thoroughfare with an efficient traffic flow and 
minimum of accidents. 
(emphasis added). The downzoning, however, restrictively limits 
the Smiths' commercially zoned property to a depth of about 200 
feet, restricts the commercial development on the Smith property to 
essentially a strip-type development, and results in a direct and 
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non-compensated diminution in the value of the property of over 
$500,000.00. (R. at 143; 173-192; 463). 
11. The previous C-2 zone would allow the larger lots called 
for in the goal and policies for the 700 East Commercial District. 
(R. at 143; 463). 
12. The Sandy Community Citizens1 Report stated as its goal: 
"Encourage commercial development." The committee listed the 
following as its commercial policies: 
Be selective in commercial uses. 
Encourage employment for citizens of Sandy. 
Widen sidewalks to 6'. 
Provide landscaping as buffer especially when next to 
residential or if the use closes late. 
Consider uses such as furniture shops, clothing/dress 
shops, residential services, sports shops, thrift shops. 
Provide architectural review of plans in site review. 
Many of the commercial uses suggested by the Report are uses that 
were allowed in the C-2 zone. (R. at 140; 462). 
13. The report of the Sandy City Planning Staff presented 
before the Sandy City Council on September 30, 1980, included the 
following recommendation: 
[w]ith the existing commercial it appears there may be 
excessive commercially zoned land and developed 
commercial square footage in this area for this type of 
commercial use development. Additional concerns were 
over the number of stub streets that go into the back of 
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the property, existing street pattern and traffic 
generation and the access to future commercial 
development. 
(R. at 460-461). 
14. However, because the existing commercial development and 
the rear undeveloped acreage are in common ownership, the existing 
development does not impede commercial development on the rear 
acreage. If necessary, the existing structures can be modified or 
razed to open up the rear acreage to 700 East. (R. at 143-144; 
463) . 
15. The rear acreage of the property is surrounded on three 
sides by existing subdivisions the homes in which are deteriorating 
low-end housing 25 to 35 years old. Constructing new homes in the 
center of this developed area would fail to make any economic sense 
and render the new homes virtually unmarketable. Constructing a 
rental complex of duplexes at the core of established single-family 
homes would be detrimental to the existing community particularly 
because of the intense and increased traffic which would traverse 
the subdivision streets, namely Brighton View Drive. Furthermore, 
the residential traffic would have no access to 700 East through 
the existing Smith commercial development, since residential and 
commercial uses should not be mingled in that fashion, and there 
are no public streets giving the residentially zoned area access to 
700 East. (R. at 144; 203-217; 464). 
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16. Restoration of the C-2 zone to the Smiths1 rear acreage 
would ensure direct access of all commercial uses to 700 East, and 
would not create traffic hazards in the surrounding subdivisions. 
(R. at 145; 464) . 
Facts Material to the Smiths1 Wrongful Barricade Claim 
17. The Smiths1 property is abutted by subdivisions on the 
north, south, and west sides. Approximately 286 feet of the 
property directly accesses 700 East Street. (R. at 694-695). 
18. 1055/1075 East Street runs from the Smiths1 north 
property line to the southeast. The street curves to the 
southeast, resulting in a change of numerical designation. (R. at 
694) . 
19. On May 30, 1978, the Sandy City Council voted to install 
permanent barricades at the south end of 1055 East. (R. at 695). 
20. The barricades block egress and ingress to and from the 
Smiths1 property. (R. at 740). 
21. 1055/1075 East Street had been used by the public for 
over twelve years when Sandy City erected the barricade. (R. at 
740, 743, 764-766). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court clearly erred in its findings. First, Sandy 
City arbitrarily and capriciously downzoned a major portion of the 
Smiths1 property, thus removing all possibility of economically 
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viable use for both commercial and residential purposes. The 
court, however, found that such downzoning was justified and 
adequately supported, despite the fact that the reasons, or 
supposed "evils" that Sandy City was seeking to correct were in 
fact either non-existent or problems of Sandy City's own making. 
Furthermore, the court found that a compensable "taking" had not 
occurred. Application of an overly restricted and narrow "takings" 
analysis apparently required this conclusion. The Smiths have 
expected and intended to develop the entire parcel commercially 
since they purchased the property in 1960, and have made 
substantial commitments, investments and instituted long-term 
planning in reliance upon that expectation. It is undisputed that 
the highest and best use of the property is that of commercial 
development, and that a portion of the Smith property was in fact 
put to that use. It is likewise undisputed that the downzoning 
resulted in direct damage to the Smiths1; i.e., a diminution in the 
value of their property of hundreds of thousands of dollars. 
Despite these facts, and in contradiction to recent case law the 
court found that compensation was not required. 
Finally, Sandy City has erected barricades at the south end of 
1055/1075 East Street. These barricades effectively restrict 
access to the Smiths1 property, and are in blatant disregard of the 
fact that the street has been dedicated to the public use under 
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Utah law. Consequently, the trial court's entry of summary 
judgment on these issues should be reversed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
SANDY CITY'S DOWNZONING IS INVALID ON DUE 
PROCESS GROUNDS BECAUSE IT BEARS NO RELATION 
TO THE HEALTH, SAFETY OR WELFARE OF THE 
COMMUNITY: EVEN ASSUMING. ARGUENDO, THAT THE 
DOWNZONING IS A VALID EXERCISE OF THE POLICE 
POWER. IT CONSTITUTES A COMPENSABLE TAKING. 
A. THE DOWNZONING IS INVALID BECAUSE IT BEARS NO RELATION TO 
THE HEALTH, SAFETY OR WELFARE OF THE COMMUNITY AND IS 
UNDULY OPPRESSIVE TO THE SMITHS. 
Sandy City has attempted to justify its downzoning decision by 
relying upon the "deference" granted zoning officials in these 
matters. However, accepting Sandy City's position in this case is 
tantamount to disposing entirely of all fundamental due process 
requirements and guarantees. Contrary to the conclusion of the 
trial court, a governmental entity does not enjoy unfettered 
discretion when its actions affect private property rights. 
Rather, the City must show that it is acting within its police 
power, not only to promote the health, safety, morals and general 
welfare of the community, but that a public benefit is in fact 
conferred as well. Here, Sandy City has failed to make any showing 
that, through the downzoning, it was attempting to correct some 
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"evil"; furthermore, Sandy Cityfs alleged concerns, as fully set 
forth below, are not alleviated by the downzoning. 
In Presbytery of Seattle v. King County, 787 P.2d 907 (Wash. 
1990) cert denied 498 U.S. 911, the Supreme Court of Washington set 
forth a three part test to determine whether a zoning regulation 
violates substantive due process: (1) whether the regulation was 
aimed at achieving a legitimate public purpose; that is, whether 
there was a public "evil" to correct; (2) whether the regulation 
uses means reasonably necessary to achieve the purpose (whether it 
tends to solve the problem) ; and (3) whether the regulation is 
unduly oppressive to the landowner. Id. at 913. 
Under such an analysis, Sandy City's downzoning of the Smiths1 
property cannot withstand attack or pass muster. There is a 
surprising paucity of reasons asserted by Sandy City for the 
downzoning. However, based upon the Sandy Community Citizens1 
Report and the Sandy City Comprehensive Plan Goals & Policies, both 
of which were admittedly relied upon by Sandy City, the reasons 
appear to be based upon concerns regarding stub streets, access to 
future commercial development, and a professed citizens1 preference 
for a more limited commercial development. 
These reasons are patently insufficient to support the City's 
actions, particularly in light of the economic impact on the 
Smiths. First, the "stub streets" referred to by the City extend 
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into the Smiths1 rear acreage. The City claims that these streets 
create traffic circulation problems, which are allegedly alleviated 
by the change in zoning. Second, the City has failed to address or 
explain exactly why residential, as opposed to commercial zoning 
will alleviate these problems. In fact, commercial zoning would 
solve any problem of commercial traffic through the subdivisions, 
since full and complete ingress and egress would be obtained onto 
and from 700 East. However, since allowing residential access 
through the existing commercial development is impracticable and 
undesirable, any existing traffic problem would actually be 
exacerbated by residential development on the downzoned portion of 
the Smiths1 property. 
Furthermore, by forcing the Smiths to bear the expense of 
alleviating the claimed stub street problem, Sandy City is 
essentially demanding that the Smiths bear the expense of a public 
benefit. No legal precedent requiring such a result exists and the 
City's attempt to force such a conclusion should be forthwith 
rejected and dismissed. The Smiths did not extend the residential 
streets to the area. Rather, most of the surrounding subdivisions 
were recorded prior to the Smiths1 purchasing and obtaining 
commercial zoning on the property. Consequently, any concerns 
about the stub streets should have been raised with the City in 
1960, not in 1980. 
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The City's second concern involves access to any future 
commercial development on the rear acreage. Such access from 700 
East could be obtained by simply making alterations in the existing 
commercial development fronting 700 East. Jack DeMass, an expert 
land planner, surveyor and development consultant, has stated that 
allowing such access for residential uses on the rear acreage is 
impracticable and unworkable. His opinions and conclusions remain 
undisputed. 
Finally, the City has asserted that "there may be excessive 
commercially zoned land." Specifically, the existing 364,500 
square feet of retail space exceeds the Commercial/Industrial Study 
recommendation that Community Commercial should not exceed 250,000 
square feet retail space. Furthermore, the City planned to limit 
the depth of 7 00 East commercial development to 2 00 feet unless 
conditional use approval was granted. However, upon close 
examination, these justifications do not lend any support to the 
Cityfs decision and subsequent actions. The depth suggestion 
ignores the existence of other commercial developments along 7 00 
East with depths that greatly exceed 2 00 feet2. Furthermore, the 
depth suggestion completely ignores the fact that the Sandy City 
2
 Directly across from the Smith property, on 7 00 East, is a 
commercial zone which extends to a depth similar to that of the 
entire Smith parcel. The commercial developments at the corner of 
9400 South and 700 East are also much deeper than 200 feet. 
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Comprehensive Plan Goals & Policies expressly recommended a policy 
which would preclude the development of typical strip commercial 
and to allow 700 East to accomplish its function as an important 
high volume traffic artery. Since the downzoning limits the 
Smiths1 commercially zoned property to a depth of about 200 feet, 
it restricts the commercial development on the Smith property to 
essentially a strip-type development. In light of Sandy City's 
failure to comply with its own stated goals and policies, it is 
difficult to ascertain or discern any substantial relation to 
public health, welfare or safety wrought by the downzoning. The 
plain fact is that Sandy City has done exactly what the law 
prohibits. It has ignored the Smiths1 private property rights and 
interests and in so doing has turned a deaf ear to fundamental due 
process. 
B. SANDY CITY»S DOWNZONING RESULTS IN AN UNCOMPENSATED 
TAKING OF THE SMITHS1 PROPERTY. 
Even assuming, arguendo, that Sandy City's action was a valid 
exercise of its police power, there can be no question that the 
downzoning has resulted in an uncompensated taking which mandates 
redress. Not only does the downzoning fail to advance legitimate 
governmental interests, it denies the Smiths the economically 
viable use of their land. Allowing a governmental entity to 
effectuate a dramatic diminution in value and use of property for 
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the sole purpose of vaguely enunciated public goals with absolutely 
no compensation to the landowner constitutes a direct violation of 
established constitutional principles. 
The United States Supreme Court has long noted that zoning 
regulations may go too far, and thus constitute a taking, in some 
circumstances. "[A]ssuming . . .a proper exertion of the police 
power, it does not follow that the due process clause of the 14th 
Amendment would not safeguard to the owner just compensation for 
the use of its property." Delaware L. & W. R. Co. v. Morristown, 
276 U.S. 192, 193 (1928) (citations omitted). 
Here, Sandy City, with a single stroke of the pen, has 
prevented any kind of commercial development on the rear 15.8 acres 
of the Smiths1 property. This downzoning constitutes a deprivation 
of the highest and best use of the property. Jerry R. Webber, the 
Smiths1 retained MAI appraiser, stated in his Affidavit that the 
downzoning reduced the value of the rear acreage by over 
$500,000.003, and stated unequivocally that the highest and best 
use of the Smiths1 property is commercial. 
Residential development, which is the option remaining to the 
Smiths, is simply not economically warranted, as Jack DeMass stated 
3
 Mr. Webber's testimony is not offered to prove the exact 
amount of damages, but, rather, to prove that the downzoning caused 
substantial injury and damage to the Smiths1 property and property 
interests. 
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in his Affidavit4. The rear acreage of the property is surrounded 
on three sides by existing subdivisions which range in age from 3 0 
to 3 5 years with older, deteriorating low-end housing of 
approximately the same age. The construction of new homes in the 
midst of the existing development makes no economic sense and 
without doubt such use is incompatible with the undisputed highest 
and best use of the Smith property. 
A rental community is not only unfeasible, it would likely 
cause significant ingress and egress problems. Such a community 
consisting, for example, of duplexes, would necessitate intense 
traffic through the existing subdivision streets. Such a result 
would obviously be detrimental to the existing community. The 
residential traffic would be unable to access 700 East through the 
existing Smith commercial development, since residential and 
commercial uses should not be mingled in that fashion, and there 
are no public streets giving the residentially zoned area access to 
700 East. How Sandy City plans to deal with those problems which 
it has specifically identified and condemned remains a mystery. 
The trial court found that a taking did not exist because some 
"reasonable use" of the property remained available to the Smiths. 
Admittedly, some courts have held that, in order to be compensable, 
4
 The Affidavits of Mr. Webber and Mr. DeMass were both 
before the trial court for consideration. 
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a zoning change must remove all economically viable use of the 
property; undoubtedly, Sandy City will assert this position in its 
brief. However, the better-reasoned legal analysis would not 
require complete destruction of the economic use of the property as 
a condition precedent to a finding that a compensable taking has 
occurred. 
A significant number of federal courts have held, in recent 
decisions, that a denial of all economically viable uses of 
property, even if such denial does not constitute a destruction of 
all use, will result in a compensable taking. This is particularly 
true since property owners frequently enjoy investment backed 
expectations in certain types of development which are frustrated 
by governmental regulation. 
In Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. U.S.r 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed.Cir. 
1994) , the landowners challenged, on takings grounds, the denial of 
a fill permit which was necessary to complete an ongoing real 
estate development. The parcel consisted of 12.5 acres, 11.5 of 
which were wetlands. The court noted that the fair market value of 
the parcel prior to permit denial was $2,658,000, and $12,500 after 
denial. Id. at 1174-1175. A regulation would go "too far," and 
thus constitute a taking, based upon the following criteria: "(1) 
the character of the governmental action; (2) the economic impact 
of the regulation on the claimant, and (3) the extent to which the 
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regulation interfered with distinct investment-backed 
expectations." Id. at 1176. In Loveladies, since the plaintiffs 
purchased the land before denial of the permits, there was a 
distinct investment-backed expectation in a certain development, 
because the plaintiffs could not have known, when they purchased 
the property, that the permits would be denied. Id. at 1179. 
Importantly, the Loveladies court recognized that the U.S. 
Supreme Court had not yet ruled upon the issue of whether a partial 
or complete loss of economic use is sufficient to constitute a 
taking. In fact, in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 
S.Ct. 2886 (1992), the Court discussed both approaches. 
Loveladies, at 1180. However, the Loveladies court found that the 
significant diminution in value in this case was sufficient to 
constitute a taking. Id. at 1181. See Bowles v. U.S.r 31 Fed.CI. 
37 (1994) (denial of fill permit constituted taking under less than 
total deprivation analysis; denial of permit rendered construction 
of single-family residences, which was the only economically viable 
use of the property, and which was supported by investment 
expectations, impossible). 
In the recent case of K & K Constr. , Inc. , J.F.K. v. 
Department of Natural Resources, 551 N.W.2d 413 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1996) appeal granted 562 N.W.2d 788, the Michigan Court of Appeals 
considered the issue of diminution. The plaintiffs applied for a 
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permit to build a restaurant which was denied on the grounds that 
the parcel included protected wetlands. Plaintiffs challenged the 
denial on Fifth Amendment grounds. Plaintiffs' experts opined that 
the property was essentially worthless for any purpose other than 
commercial development. Id. at 419. The court noted that the area 
surrounding the wetlands parcel could be developed as a restaurant; 
however, such development was not economically feasible because of 
land needs for a restaurant or any other commercial use, including 
parking. Consequently, a compensable taking had occurred. Id. 
The same decision was reached by the Iowa Supreme Court in 
Kempf v. City of Iowa Cityr 402 N.W.2d 393 (Iowa 1987). The 
plaintiff had begun construction of an office building and the 
first of five apartment structures on a 4 acre tract when its 
building permit was revoked, and the zoning changed. The 
plaintiff's expert testified that, before the downzoning, the value 
of the remaining 2.12 acres was $2 00,000, and the value after the 
downzoning was $52,000. Furthermore, construction of duplexes, the 
remaining alternative, was not economically feasible. The court 
held that a taking had occurred, noting that: 
[t]he overwhelming evidence discloses the lots and the 
remaining 2.12 acres of the Kempf tract cannot be 
improved with any development that would be economically 
feasible. For this reason, we find that application of 
the downzoning ordinance to the lots in the 2.12 acres 
would be unreasonable. 
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Id, at 399-400. 
The Kempf court also expressly considered the plaintiff's 
reasonable investment-backed expectations in development. The 
court noted that the plaintiff had made a "large investment" in 
"filling, grading, and bringing in utilities for the whole tract in 
reliance on the zoning and the city's study . . . ." Id. 
Consideration of investment-backed expectations was also an express 
part of the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Lucas v. South 
Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S.Ct. 2886 (1992). 
Here, the Smiths instituted commercial development on the 
front portion of the property with the intent and expectation that, 
eventually, the entire tract would be developed commercially. This 
expectation is in accordance with the opinions of the Smiths' 
experts that commercial development is the highest and best use of 
the land, and the only feasible type of development. Recognition 
of these expectations, mandated by Lucas, requires a finding that 
a compensable taking has occurred. 
A liberal view of the deprivation of economic use rule is not 
only supported by case law, it is directed by the Utah 
Constitution. Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution is 
significantly broader than its federal counterpart. That Section 
provides: "[p]rivate property shall not be taken or damaged for 
public use without just compensation." (emphasis added). The 
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Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, of course, does 
not refer to "damage." Unfortunately, there is a scarcity of Utah 
law interpreting this provision. However, it is difficult to 
imagine a clearer-cut basis for application of the provision than 
the present case. The severe economic damage to the Smiths, 
coupled with Sandy City's failure to present any compelling 
justification or purpose for the downzoning, mandates a finding 
that a compensable taking has occurred. 
II. 
CONSTRUCTION OF THE BARRICADE ON 1055/1075 
EAST STREET IS ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, AND DOES 
NOT ALLOW THE SMITHS REASONABLE ACCESS TO 
THEIR PROPERTY. 
Sandy City's barricade of 1055/1075 East Street is 
insupportable. It constitutes an abuse of the police power, 
prevents the Smiths from reasonable access to their property, and 
improperly restricts access to a street which has been dedicated to 
the public. 
In support of its action, Sandy City has attempted to assert 
that it acted within its police power in barricading the subject 
street, and, therefore, it is "unnecessary" for this Court to 
review its action. The actions of governmental entities are indeed 
reviewable, to the extent that they are arbitrary or 
unconstitutional. State v. Hutchinson, 624 P.2d 1116, 1126 (Utah 
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1980) (courts will review local decisions which are "arbitrary, or 
[are] directly prohibited by . . .the state or federal laws or the 
constitution of this state or of the United States"). 
Utah courts have not hesitated to review and invalidate local 
ordinances which constitute invalid exercises of the police power. 
See Gibbons & Reed Company v. North Salt Lake City, 431 P.2d 559 
(Utah 1967) (holding that a zoning ordinance which prohibited the 
removal of sand and gravel was an invalid exercise of the police 
power, and would result in a severe loss to the landowners and to 
the public). 
Furthermore, Sandy City's action is in direct violation of 
U.C.A. § 27-12-89, which deems a road used by the public for over 
ten years to be dedicated to the public use. As Sandy City 
admitted in its Answers to Plaintiff's First Set of 
Interrogatories, the road in question had been used by the public 
for over twelve years when Sandy City erected the blockade. 
The trial court erroneously concluded that the Smiths still 
have reasonable access to their property. However, the Smiths 
dispute that the alternative accesses constitute "reasonable 
access." Also, Sandy City has incorrectly asserted that 
compensation is not available where the plaintiff has reasonable 
access. Compensation is available where a governmental action 
"substantially impairs a right appurtenant to an owner's 
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property . . . .If Three D Corp, v. Salt Lake Cityf 752 P. 2d 1321, 
1326 (Utah Ct.App. 1988). Here, the Smiths1 right to access their 
property, and to provide the public access, has been substantially 
impaired. 
Sandy City also argues that the Smiths have not suffered a 
physical taking and, therefore, are not entitled to compensation. 
This assertion is clearly contrary to prevailing federal and state 
law. See Katsos v. Salt Lake City Corp., 634 F.Supp. 100 (D.Utah 
1986) (holding that low airplane overflights which constitute a 
direct and immediate interference with the owner's land constitute 
a taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment), Boskovich v. Midvale 
City Corp., 243 P. 2d 435 (Utah 1952) (compensable taking occurred 
where the city closed a portion of a street to create a private 
cul-de-sac). 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's grant of summary judgment should be reversed 
for two reasons. First, Sandy City has downzoned a significant 
portion of the Smiths' property without presenting any justifiable, 
reasonable, or legally cognizable basis for doing so. This 
downzoning has deprived the Smiths of the economically viable use 
of their property. It is insupportable to permit Sandy City to 
arbitrarily downzone the Smiths' property, depriving the Smiths of 
their reasonable expectations of development, which expectations 
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were in fact encouraged by Sandy City, without the payment of any 
compensation whatsoever. 
Second, the barricades at the south end of 1055/1075 East 
Street, a dedicated street, constitute yet another abuse of 
authority and infringement upon the Smiths1 property rights. 
Consequently, the trial court's entry of summary judgment on these 
issues should be reversed and the Smiths awarded their costs. 
DATED: July 9, 1997. 
CAMPBELL^MAACK & SESSIONS 
/ / 
'^^//// %L 
CLARK W. SESSION 
KRISTINE EDDE 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
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JODY K BURNETT (A0499) 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Sandy City 
257 East 200 South, Suite 500 
Post Office Box 45678 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5678 
Telephone: (801) 521-5678 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SMITH INVESTMENT COMPANY, ET 
AL., : SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND ORDER 
: OF DISMISSAL 
Plaintiffs, : 
V. : Civil No. 880901965 CV 
SANDY CITY, ET AL. , : Judge Timothy R. Hanson 
Defendants. : 
This matter came before the Court on February 2, 1996, for 
oral argument on certain dispositive motions in these 
consolidated cases pursuant to this Court's Pretrial Order of 
November 30, 1995. Plaintiffs were represented by Clark W. 
Sessions and Kristine Edde. Defendant Sandy City was represented 
by Jody K Burnett and Kathleen R. Jeffery. The claims against 
defendant Utah Department of Transportation were previously 
dismissed without prejudice by plaintiffs as set forth in the 
Pretrial Order. 
Pursuant to the provisions of the Pretrial Order, the Court 
heard oral argument on motions for summary judgment regarding the 
following issues: 
1. Cross-motions for summary judgment relating to 
plaintiff's downzoning claims set forth in the Third Cause of 
Action of Case No. C-88-1965. 
2. Defendant Sandy City's Motion for Summary Judgment on 
the plaintiffs' claim that Sandy City wrongfully barricaded a 
street designated as 1055/1075 East as set forth in Case 
No. C-78-6419. 
3. Defendant Sandy City's Motion for Summary Judgment on 
the plaintiffs' claim that drainage from the Brighton View and 
De-1 Ruby Subdivisions which were approved by Sandy City 
trespasses on plaintiffs' property as set forth in the Second 
Cause of Action of Case No. C-88-1965. 
The Court having reviewed the legal memoranda and exhibits 
of the parties and having considered the oral argument of 
counsel, and being fully advised, issued its Memorandum Decision 
dated May 21, 1996. Pursuant to that Memorandum Decision, it is 
hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED as follows: 
1. With respect to the parties' cross-motions for summary 
judgment on the plaintiffs' downzoning claim as set forth in the 
Third Cause of Action of Case No. C-88-1965, defendant Sandy 
City's Motion for Summary Judgment on the downzoning issue is 
hereby granted for the reasons advanced by defendant Sandy City 
in its moving papers and oral argument, and on the grounds 
identified in the Memorandum Decision of May 21, 1996, that the 
Court is satisfied there is a sufficient basis in the record to 
support the defendant's rezoning of the subject property from 
commercial as it was originally established in the early 1960s, 
to residential (not totally residential) in 1981. The record 
supports a reasonable basis for effecting the zoning change of 
1981. The test of a rational relationship to public health, 
safety and welfare is supported in the record. Further, it does 
not appear that the rezoning has resulted in plaintiffs being 
unable to use the property in question for any reasonable use, 
and therefore no "taking" exists under the rezoning. As the 
plaintiffs could put the property to multiple reasonable uses, 
other than the expansion of the plaintiffs' commercial 
environment that exists along the frontage of the property, there 
is not a "taking." The Court rejects the plaintiffs' legal 
theory that a diminution in value based upon the plaintiffs not 
being able to use the property for the plaintiffs' perceived 
highest and best use is a basis upon which to conclude that there 
has been a "taking." 
2. Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment on the 
downzoning claim set forth in the Third Cause of Action of Case 
No. C-88-1965 is denied on the grounds set forth above. 
3. Defendant Sandy City's Motion for Summary Judgment on 
the plaintiffs' claim that drainage from the Brighton View and 
Del Ruby Subdivisions which were approved by Sandy City 
trespasses on plaintiffs' property as set forth in the Second 
Cause of Action of Case No. C-88-1965 is hereby granted for the 
reasons advanced by defendant Sandy City in its moving papers and 
oral argument, and on the grounds identified in the Memorandum 
Decision of May 21, 1996, that the trespass claim stems from an 
approval by Sandy City of Brighton View and Del Ruby Subdivisions 
many years ago. The approval of those subdivision plats do not 
support a cause of action for escaping water from property owned 
by various non-named landowners adjacent to the plaintiffs' 
property. While plaintiffs may have a cause of action for the 
claimed escaping water, it is not against the defendant Sandy 
City upon the basis alleged. 
4. Defendant Sandy City's Motion for Summary Judgment on 
the plaintiffs' claim that Sandy City wrongfully barricaded a 
street designated as 1055/1075 East as set forth in Case 
No. C-78-6419 is hereby granted for the reasons advanced by 
defendant Sandy City in its moving papers and oral argument, and 
on the grounds identified in the Memorandum Decision of May 21, 
1996, that the record shows that the street is part of an 
adjacent subdivision that abuts the plaintiffs' undeveloped 
property. The pavement ends at the plaintiffs' property line, 
and Sandy City has apparently placed a barricade prohibiting 
vehicular traffic from leaving the end of the paved street to 
come upon the plaintiffs' undeveloped property. While at some 
future time it may be appropriate to have the barricade removed 
should the street be extended into what is now the plaintiffs' 
property, the City's action in barricading the end of the paved 
street at the property line between the developed subdivision and 
the plaintiffs' property is appropriate. The plaintiff has other 
access to its undeveloped property, and there presently exists no 
legitimate claim against Sandy City for blocking vehicular 
traffic at the end of the paved section of the roadway. 
All other issues between the parties have been resolved. 
Based on the foregoing orders and for the reasons more fully set 
forth above, all of plaintiffs/ claims and complaints in the 
consolidated matters as referenced in the Pretrial Order of 
November 30, 1995, are hereby DISMISSED, with prejudice and upon 
the merits, no cause of action. 
DATED this ^ 3 ^ day of Seft^. , 1996. 
BY THE COURT: 
By bj 
Timothy R. Hanson 
District Court Judge 
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Beverly Riemann, being duly sworn, says that she is employed 
in the law offices of Williams & Huntf attorneys for defendant 
Sandy City herein; that she served the attached proposed SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL in Civil No, 880901965CV in the 
Third District Court for Salt Lake County, upon the parties 
listed below by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an 
envelope addressed to: 
Counsel for Plaintiffs 
Clark W. Sessions 
One Utah Center - 13th Floor 
201 South Main Street 
Salt Lake Cit^ y, UT 84101-1605 
Kathleen R. Jeffery 
Sandy City Corporation 
10000 Centennial Parkway 
Sandy, UT 84070 
and causing the same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid, 
on the 14th day of June, 1996. 
Beverly Rifemann ; ei 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 
September, 1996, 
$ day of 
U '(MuJ D xlUjU(fhy fotafcy Public 
isirdina in the S ta te pt Utah 
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DECLARATION OF RIGHTS Art. I, § 22 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
In general 
Appointment of administrator of estate 
Withholding tax 
In general. 
No man can have a vested interest in the 
work or labor of another, nor has he a right to 
insist that another work for him, since that 
would violate this section McGrew v Indus-
trial Comm'n, 96 Utah 203, 85 P.2d 608 (1938) 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 45 Am Jur 2d Involuntary 
Servitude and Peonage § 1 et seq 
History: Const. 1896. 
Cross-References. — Eminent domain gen« 
erally § 78-34-1 et seq 
ANALYSIS 







Defense to condemnation proceeding 
Elements of taking or damage 




Interest in condemnation proceedings 
Inverse condemnation 
Just compensation 
Municipal employment prerequisites 
Removal of personal property 
Services of attornev in defending indigent 




Advance payment of compensation. 
This section provides merely that the prop-
Appointment of administrator of estate. 
This section prohibits the appointment of a 
person to serve as administrator of a decedent's 
estate if that person refuses to consent to such 
appointment In re Estate of duff, 587 P.2d 
128 (Utah 1978) 
Withholding tax. 
Provision requiring that a city withhold 
state income taxes due from employees does 
not subject the city to involuntary servitude 
Salt Lake City v State Tax Comm'n, 11 Utah 
2d 359, 359 P.2d 397 (1961) 
C.J.S. — 70 C.J.S Peonage § 3, 80 C.J.S 
Slaves § 10 
Key Numbers. — Slaves «= 24 
erty shall not be taken or damaged for public 
use without just compensation, and does not 
require compensation to be paid in advance 
Anderson Inv Corp v State, 28 Utah 2d 379, 
503 P.2d 144 (1972) 
Airplane overflights. 
For discussion of taking issues in an action 
by landowners alleging that their land has 
been "taken" by overflights, see Katsos v Salt 
Lake City Corp , 634 F Supp 100 (D Utah 
1986) 
Closing street. 
Where city, without notice, petition, or hear-
ing, closes a portion of a street and alley abut-
ting on school board-owned property on both 
sides and used for vehicular travel, and thus 
creates a cul-de-sac as to privately owned prop-
erty, there has been a taking requiring just 
compensation Boskovich v Midvale City 
Corp, 121 Utah 445, 243 P2d 435 (1952) 
Closing of city street and alleged impair-
ment of access to commercial properties was 
not a "damaging" or "taking" within the mean-
ing of this section, the alleged damages re-
sulted from a temporary, one-time occurrence 
and not a permanent, continuous, or inevitably 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Sec. 22. [Private property for public use.] 
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just 
compensation 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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AMENDMENT V—GRAND JURY INDICTMENT FOR CAPITAL 
CRIMES; DOUBLE JEOPARDY; SELF-INCRIMINATION; 
DUE PROCESS OF LAW; JUST COMPENSATION FOR 
PROPERTY 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise 
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand 
Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the 
Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor 
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in 
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal 
case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property 
be taken for public use, without just compensation. 
HISTORICAL NOTES 
Proposal and Ratification were ratified on December 15, 1791. 
The first ten amendments to the Con- For the states which ratified these 
stitution were proposed to the Legisla- amendments, and the dates of rat-
tures of the several states by the First ification, see Historical Notes under 
Congress on September 25, 1789, and Amendment I. 
WESTLAW ELECTRONIC RESEARCH 
WESTLAW supplements U.S.C.A. electronically and is useful for additional 
research. Enter a citation in INSTA-CITE for display of parallel citations 
and case history. Enter a constitution, statute or rule citation in a case law 
database for cases of interest. 
Example query for INSTA-CITE: 790 F.2d 978 
Example query for United States Constitution: (first +6 amendment) +s 
religion 
Example query for statute: "42 U.S.C.*" 4-4 1983 
Also, see the WESTLAW guide following the Explanation pages of this 
volume. 
A m e n d m e n t V . Grand Jury Indictment for Capital Crimes 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise 
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand 
Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the 
Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; * * 
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AMENDMENT XIV—CITIZENSHIP; PRIVILEGES AND IMMU-
NITIES; DUE PROCESS; EQUAL PROTECTION; APPOR-
TIONMENT OF REPRESENTATION; DISQUALIFICATION 
OF OFFICERS; PUBLIC DEBT; ENFORCEMENT 
Materials for the Citizenship and Privileges and Immunities 
Clauses of Section 1 are set out in this volume. See the 
following three volumes for materials pertaining to the Due 
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of that section and 
Sections 2 to 5. 
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, 
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or 
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to 
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the sev-
eral States according to their respective numbers, counting the 
whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not 
taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of 
electors for President and Vice President of the United States, 
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a 
State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of 
the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, 
and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for 
participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representa-
tion therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of 
such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens 
twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Section 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in 
Congress, or elector of President and Vice President, or hold any 
office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, 
who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or 
as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State 
legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to 
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in 
insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort 
to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds 
of each House, remove such disability. 
Section 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, 
authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pen-
sions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebel-
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lion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any 
State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of 
insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for 
the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obli-
gations and claims shall be held illegal and void. 
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appro-
priate legislation, the provisions of this article. 
HISTORICAL NOTES 
Proposal and Ratification 
This amendment was proposed to the 
legislatures of the several States by the 
Thirty-ninth Congress, on June 13, 1866. 
On July 21, 1868, Congress adopted and 
transmitted to the Department of State a 
concurrent resolution, declaring that 
"the legislatures of the States of Connect-
icut, Tennessee, New Jersey, Oregon, 
Vermont, New York, Ohio, Illinois, West 
Virginia, Kansas, Maine, Nevada, Mis-
souri, Indiana, Minnesota, New Hamp-
shire, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Iowa, 
Arkansas, Florida, North Carolina, Ala-
bama, South Carolina, and Louisiana, 
being three-fourths and more of the sev-
eral States of the Union, have ratified 
the fourteenth article of amendment to 
the Constitution of the United States, 
duly proposed by two-thirds of each 
House of the Thirty-ninth Congress: 
Therefore, Resolved, That said four-
teenth article is hereby declared to be a 
part of the Constitution of the United 
States, and it shall be duly promulgated 
as such by the Secretary of State." The 
Secretary of State accordingly issued a 
proclamation, dated July 28, 1868, de-
claring that the proposed fourteenth 
amendment had been ratified by the leg-
islatures of thirty of the thirty-six States. 
The amendment was ratified by the State 
Legislatures on the following dates: 
Connecticut, June 25, 1866; New Hamp-
shire, July 6, 1866; Tennessee, July 19, 
1866; New Jersey, Sept. 11, 1866; Ore-
gon, Sept. 19, 1866; Vermont, Oct. 30, 
1866; Ohio, Jan. 4, 1867; New York, 
Jan. 10, 1867; Kansas, Jan. 11, 1867; 
Illinois, Jan. 15, 1867; West Virginia, 
Jan. 16, 1867; Michigan, Jan. 16, 1867; 
Minnesota, Jan. 16, 1867; Maine, Jan' 
19, 1867; Nevada, Jan. 22, 1867; 
Indiana, Jan. 23, 1867; Missouri, Jan' 
25, 1867; Rhode Island, Feb. 7, 1867;' 
Wisconsin, Feb. 7, 1867; Pennsylvania,' 
Feb. 12, 1867; Massachusetts, Mar. 20, 
1867; Nebraska, June 15, 1867; Iowa! 
Mar. 16, 1868; Arkansas, Apr. 6, 1868; 
Florida, June 9, 1868; North Carolina! 
July 4, 1868; Louisiana, July 9, 1868-
South Carolina, July 9, 1868; Alabama' 
July 13, 1868; Georgia, July 21, 1868! 
Subsequent to the proclamation the fol-
lowing States ratified this amendment: 
Virginia, Oct. 8, 1869; Mississippi, Jan 
17, 1870; Texas, Feb. 18, 1870; Dela-
ware, Feb. 12, 1901; Maryland, Apr. 4 
1959; California, May 6, 1959; and Ken-
tucky, Mar. 18, 1976. 
The Fourteenth Amendment originally 
was rejected by Delaware, Georgia, Loui-
siana, North Carolina, South Carolina, 
Texas and Virginia. However, the State 
Legislatures of the aforesaid States sub-
sequently ratified the amendment on the 
dates set forth in the preceding para-
graph. Kentucky and Maryland rejected 
this amendment on Jan. 10, 1867 and 
Mar. 23, 1867, respectively. 
The States of New Jersey, Ohio and 
Oregon "withdrew" their consent to the 
ratification of this amendment on Mar. 
24, 1868, Jan. 15, 1868, and Oct. 15, 
1868, respectively. 
The State of New Jersey expressed 
support for this amendment on Nov. 12, 
1980. 
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(i) the permission shall contain the condition that any instal-
lation will be removed from the right-of-way at the request of the 
city or town; and 
(ii) the city or town shall cause any installation to be removed 
at the request of the department when the department finds the 
removal necessary: 
(A) to eliminate a hazard to traffic safety; 
(B) for the construction and maintenance of the state 
highway; or 
(C) to meet the requirements of federal regulations. 
(3) If it is necessary that a utility, as defined in Section 27-12-11, be 
relocated on federal-aid highways, reimbursement shall be made for the 
relocation as provided for in Section 27-12-11. 
(4) (a) The department shall construct curbs, gutters, and sidewalks on 
the state highways when it is found necessary by the department for 
the proper control of traffic, driveway entrances, or drainage. 
(b) If a state highway is widened or altered and existing curbs, 
gutters, and sidewalks are removed, the department shall replace the 
curbs, gutters, and sidewalks. 
(5) The department may furnish and install street lighting systems for 
the state highways, but their operation and maintenance is the responsi-
bility of the city or town. 
(6) If new storm sewer facilities are necessary in the construction and 
maintenance of the state highways, the cost of the storm sewer facilities 
shall be borne by the state and the city or town in a proportion mutually 
agreed upon between the department and the highway authorities of the 
city or town. 
(7) In accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative 
Rulemaking Act, the department may make rules governing the location 
and construction of approach roads and driveways entering the state 
highway, and the department may delegate the administration of the rules 
to the highway authorities of the city or town. 
History- L- 1963. ch. 39, § 88; 1991, ch. The 1994 amendment, effective May 2,1994, 
137, § 21; 1994, ch. 120, § 36. substituted "for highways" for "with respect to 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend- streets" in the introductory language; subdi-
ment, effective April 29, 1991, redivided Sub- vided Subsection (2); substituted "department" 
section (1) into present Subsections (1) to (3); for "commission" in Subsections (6) and (7); 
redesignated former Subsections (2) to (5) as added the code citation in Subsection (7); and 
present Subsections (3) to (7); substituted "de- made stylistic changes, 
partment" for "state road commission" through-
out the section; and made changes in punctua-
tion and phraseology. 
ARTICLE 6 
ACQUISITION OF PROPERTY FOR HIGHWAY 
PURPOSES 
27-12-89. Public use constituting dedication. 
A highway shall be deemed to have been dedicated and abandoned to the use 
of the public when it has been continuously used as a pubhc thoroughfare for 
a period of ten years. 
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OFFICE OF THE CLERK 
CLARK W. SESSIONS 
KRISTINE EDDE 
CAMPBELL, MAACK & SESSIONS 
201 S MAIN 13TH FL 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111-2215 
Smith Investment Company, 
a Utah corporation, and 
Sandy Hills, Inc., a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. No. 960486 
Sandy City, et al., 960708-CA 
Defendants and Appellees. 880901965CV 
Pursuant to the authority vested in this Court, this case 
is poured-over to the Court of Appeals for disposition. 
All further pleadings and correspondence should be directed to 
that Court. The address is 230 South 500 East, Suite 400, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84102. 
Geoffrey J. Butler 
Clerk 
